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The Flow of Experiencing in Anarchic Economies

Economics often seems to be the purview of socialists, but anarchists need to consider economic theory partly because it deals with many of the supportive structures constituting the background for autonomous life.  There is no life without supporting structures, but structures need to be designed to be fluid, receding, non-mediating, and only supportive.  Even as some actions end and some collectives of people disintegrate, something might be grown from the beginning to remain behind and serve future generations of anarchists as a starting point and place for activity and life.  The neo-liberal economic system in which life (anarchic or otherwise) takes place, has much to do with the setting of life.  It is with and in this system that anarchists must vie for living room.  Hence, the need for economic thought among anarchists.  
Additionally, in giving attention to the background of life, something vague needs to be preserved.  I contend that direct action needs a place that endures; it needs a built environment with anarchic qualities.​[1]​  We cannot manage direct action without a material environment appropriate to it, which must nonetheless come about anarchically.  This would be an environment that induces the habit of acting directly for ourselves, without thought of someone else doing it for us.  But we cannot manage anything different “tectonically”​[2]​ if we don’t transform the basic exchange relations, structures of productive activity, and forms of consumption, ownership, and use, for tectonics are products of economic activity and are property, and part of the setting of economic activity.  One difficulty of anarchic tectonics is that people develop a spiritual connection to their property, and are willing to make all sorts of concessions in their work life so long as they are masters in some degree over their residence.  In the United States, accordingly, the house-owning class is vast, and the economic background of life related to it poses the greatest challenge to thinking about transforming tectonic practice.  Anarchic thinking suggests a different economic basis for relating to the built environment.  This essay is part one of a larger project in anarchic life.  My conclusions here are deployed in an essay on anarchic architectural practices.
I am not imagining a total, novel system, but letting a plurality of theories self-organize into an anarchist economic vision. This requires not only criticism of the dominant economic paradigm, but also the inventive imagination of the goal.  Without the goals set up by human thinking and acting, we aim at nothing and hit nothing.  Moreover, not all visions are equally anarchic; some are much closer to the bull’s eye.  Thus, my second-order theory aims not for wholesale replacement of an economy, but gradual and piecemeal transformation.
I contend that there is no essentially anarchist economic theory or anarchist economy.  Anarchic economic theory is only constituted as a family of resemblances in theorizing about economic matters; having these resemblances is what gets contending theories into the arena. No single position in the argument vanquishes all others.   But an autogenerative principle comes from within to help identify the features of an anarchist economy: anarchy among theories is the standard of choosing theories to contribute to anarchist economic theory.​[3]​  Consequently, we need every “alternative economy” theorist laboring on these issues, for it is the plurality of anarchically interacting theories that will result in anarchist economic structures and practices, primarily through inspiration of actions and life.​[4]​  This is the reverse of the idea that one best vision should control the multitude of actions that an individual might undertake.  Rather than relying on any one economic theory, anarchist thought sidles up alongside every alternative to the mediating nightmares we live under today.  Any economic fiction, in order to be a tool for those who are working out individual and collective self-determination, needs to be employed anarchically, not implemented anarchistically.  So, less an anarchist economy and more an anarchic economic thinking.
There are several models of economic relations that have something to add to anarchic economic thinking.  I will briefly consider only three: a decentralist commonwealth, Economic Democracy, and Participatory Economics (Parecon).   Each of these visions not only negates epochal economic relations in contemporary societies; they also design economic arrangements that are explicitly committed to and structured by the values of autonomy, cooperation, inventiveness, self-control, joy, and balance, among others -- none of which are values highly ranked by epochal economies (economies that express a given historical order or epoch) but all of which are necessary to a good life.

A General Theory of Economy 
Anarchic thinking needs a general theory of economics that, in its very structure, allows for unmediated exchange relations to be included among economic phenomena.  I follow Manuel de Landa and the classical Daoists in thinking that flow is ontologically more basic than objects, ​[5]​ which suggests a picture of economy as the co-management of flows and interpersonal exchange actions.  Economy has always been in some sense the management of things, even from its coining in Greece long ago and through all the changes in sense.  The problem is that from Greece we also inherited an untenable substance metaphysics, a world-picture of faculty-endowed souls, defining essences, and unchanging objects. Economic theory in the European cultural region developed as a substance economics: what are managed are things, represented by money.  But more recent philosophy and much science has broken up the ice of substance metaphysics.  We need a correlative, non-substance economics.  That is flow economics.
There are two activities to which all economic entities are susceptible: exchange and flow.  Flow is most basic, since the earth and all its products are dynamic events, and any description of it discloses a network of always-already connected events, coming from some states and heading toward others.  
Exchange is how humans engage as participants in the flows.  In exchanges, an element moves from one locus to another, usually passing another element flowing in the opposite direction.​[6]​  Individual exchange action can itself be construed as a flow (internal to persons) of nutrition, waste, water, physical force, intentions, and emotion, but this flow is circulated in a certain way to manage external, non-personal flows between entities, such as materials, equipment, land, information, power of decision, wealth, values, ideas, and waste.  Exchange occurs primarily in the form of management of what flows, which involves pausing and redirecting flows, discretely or en masse.  In this dynamic view of economics, there are no static objects—there are only fluids, or events constituted of events, and it ever flows.  Products are pauses in the flow, but never final stoppages.  Furthermore, part of the management of these flows is ownership, which is the slow-down of flows for a person’s use.
Take two fluids: a bicycle and a volume of coffee beans.  In the case of the bicycle, ownership brings the movement of the bicycle through the system of exchange activities to a halt.  It comes to relative rest for a period of time in the possession of one person.  The coffee beans by contrast are destroyed in their being owned.  There is no sense in having the beans simply to have them.  They are to be consumed.  The bicycle is not to be consumed, it is to be used.  Consumption and use are two ways to slow down or complicate flows.  Use is open-handed.  The use of a bicycle does not prevent it from being used again, continuing to flow.  Consumption is transformative.  Coffee beans, for example, become forms of energy through conversion into a stimulant, and the grounds become compost.
As a theory of flows, economics describes the history and future of the interaction of powers that seek to direct and hold the flows.  Economics is thus a view of some of the conditions of individual experiencing as part of social life.  Anything that flows may be managed, and unfortunately the management of flows is not just carried out by people, but on people: e.g., wage laborers, refugees, and professional athletes.​[7]​  Experiencing—the person itself—is a fluid.  Social life as the dynamic “hanging together”​[8]​ of diverse things, people, purposes, institutions, knowledges, and practices necessarily involves grouped experiencing, and this is an intensely flowing matter, a raging whitewater streamlet.  And while it would be sufficient for individuals and voluntary groupings (I speak of groupings because a group is always an event: both a gathering and a doing) to control their own flowing and the material flows to arrange their lives, many people make it their business to control the flow of experiencing of other people.
So in regard to the essence of economy, anarchist economics seeks to liberate fluids from third-person management of flows.  It seeks to optimize the natural complications (use and consumption), holds, and re-directions, and to minimize actions that interfere with the self-determination of relevant flows.​[9]​  Individual and collective experiencing is a matter of concern to anarchists—especially being self-determining from birth to death.  But management of others’ experiencing is action that interferes with self-determination.  Hence, what anarchist economists project as the target conditions in all management of flows and exchange actions are the self-management of individual and grouped experiencing, purified of any taint of mediation.
What does experiencing apply to, and how does management of it take place?  Individual experiencing normally flows in swirls, but grouped experiencing flows transpersonally, so it both swirls and streams.  It is a flow that is refreshed by the fact that groupings are temporary and the return of individuals to face-to-face gathering brings with it ever-new components.  In the most natural grouped experiencings, the flow is co-managed by self and others.  There is a whole world of flows in groupings: emotions, comfort, perceptions, doings, speaking, and overall becoming.  This last is the open-ended possibility of existing; it is selfhood.  As philosophers since Aristotle and the first Daoists have suggested, the point of this living is the optimization of experience.  Becoming replaces identity as the “what” or “who” of experiencing by individuals and groupings.  Experiencing should be freed in fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, which is the expressive potential of personal identity (being as becoming); groupings are capable of this as well.  For Nietzsche, this required continually bringing a new person into being.  This innovation gave rise in history to numerous philosophies of becoming, which is the tradition which birthed my own thinking on these matters.  But becoming assumes self-managed experiencing, an assumption that is always betrayed by the interference actions of mediating others.  Anarchist economic actions will always guarantee the self-determination of experiencing and take mediation to be a deal-breaker.
Epochal economies—in market and central-coordinator forms—rely for their support and operation upon the act of reifying either the market or state, and transferring to capitalists or bureaucrats the management of part or all of the important aspects of experiencing.  Hence, by extension, epochal economies mediate human exchange action.  From either point of view, flows are to be managed by as few people as possible.  Coordinating bureaucrats mediate experiencing as disinterested third parties of rule enforcement, controlling exchanges anywhere within the system, which cancels flows.  Market capitalists are self-interested first-person parties of capital concentration, whose defense of their positions in the competitive system produces multiple but comparatively few massive concentrations of goods, energy and power.  These concentrations imprison flows for generations at a time, among a class of capitalists.  In either case, the result is that mediated exchange action emasculates individuals’ actions, and either neutralizes or appropriates the practice of community (the collective management of the flow of experiencing).  
A Decentralist Commonwealth
In trying to conceive an economic model that retains the best features of ideal socialism (“justice, equality, cooperation, democracy and freedom”​[10]​), Gar Alperovitz formulates a model in which “‘worker’s control’ [is] conceived in the broader context of, and subordinate to, the entire community,” since the community is the more basic and more inclusive setting of life.  Any “community as a whole locally own[s] substantial wealth-producing firms. . . .”​[11]​  Communities need to be economically embedded in the regional geography.​[12]​   Beyond the community’s region, there are matters of inter-regional interaction.  This vision is meant to address and resolve the problem of conflicts of interest between business and extra-business human community.​[13]​  To address these issues, Alperovitz insists on a society that comes together from below in its economic processes, forming from multitudes of voluntary, self-organizing exchange actions.​[14]​  His vision is of an emerging “pluralist commonwealth” in which local and regional differences are maintained, and larger-scale identities are formed through complex interactions among smaller-scale ones.  Economically, the system is based on comparatively small units, and only through a need to “work together”​[15]​ to address common problems are these units related to one another.  Such problems include volatile “market behavior” and what to do with surplus capital.  Here is where democratic planning comes in, but this takes place first and foremost on the local and regional levels.​[16]​  
At the heart of every exchange action is participation.  Citing the experiencing of still more recent worker direct-action, Alperovitz observes that “[i]n some circumstances … worker-owned firms or worker co-ops may be a building block to the future … many yield experiences with participation in general, and with economic matters in particular, that may be important to the future development of still other forms.”​[17]​  But this multiplicity of planning efforts needs a stable context to avoid “local expansionism and exploitation.”  This he finds, not in a typically gargantuan modern state, since this would eliminate real democratic involvement by most, and not in American states, most of which are too small to constitute a stable economic context, but in geographical units of 20-30 million, large enough to “tak[e] over directly (and decentraliz[e]) capital and productive functions now controlled by, say, the 500 largest economic corporations.”​[18]​  So, a dozen “confederated regions … each region made up of confederated communities.”​[19]​  Planning is carried out by professionals, but their decisions are informed by “expressed community needs and experiences … specific demands for goods and services” coming from local places, but “integrated … through regional and national politics” whose primary concern would be allocation of resources.​[20]​
Planning also acts for the future through “community investment,” in which “all major wealth (not necessarily small businesses and homes) would regularly be returned to the community that ultimately made the creation of the wealth possible.”​[21]​  The development of that public trust requires in turn a transformation of community life, along cooperative lines, for it is in the local communities that the skills and dispositions necessary to cooperation on a larger scale are learned and built up.​[22]​  This would require social cooperatives, as George Melnyk observes.​[23]​  All in all this results in an economy that forms from the bottom-up, is dynamically plurality-becoming-unanimous, and manages flows from the periphery, for the center is really only the result of many interactions, a federative model.

Economic Democracy
David Schweickart’s model​[24]​ is appropriately called “economic democracy” because it is basically an application of American political ideals to two sectors of economic life, building on successes in three other economies in the global setting: Yugoslavia from 1950 to 1979, Japan’s post-war economy, and the Mondragon cooperative system in the Basque region of Spain.  Schweickart suggests that a market economy can be improved on to the extent that democracy is applied in the lives of workers in their workplaces, and if investment of surplus is controlled through the representative democratic process and distributed through a process that is the reverse of Alperovitz’s conception: top-down, unity-plurality, center-periphery, similar in many respects to our present tax-revenue system.  
Schweickart demonstrates from studies of efficiency in worker-managed plants that worker-management is at least as productive and efficient as capitalist structured plants.  He does not mention humanitarian gains, but it is easily imagined that life in a worker-managed workplace is better overall for all involved, including bosses, who are to be elected by workers.  Workers’ dignity is enhanced through more use of their capabilities.  Worker control is perfectly compatible with capitalist structures: the studies of worker cooperatives that he cites were conducted primarily in firms operating in market economies.  
The “day-to-day economy is a market economy [in which] prices [are] determined by the forces of supply and demand.”​[25]​  Social investment, however, in which savings for future development is decoupled from allocation “of existing goods and resources,”​[26]​ is secured through taxation on capital assets and distributed by two means: first through a national legislature​[27]​ and then through regional legislatures, to which the national one has distributed monies not required for projects that are national in scope.  Regional distributions are proportional to the population.  “The national legislature may also decide that certain types of projects should be encouraged” that are not national in scope.​[28]​  This allocation is repeated by the regions to their local levels, and finally to community banks, which are governed by representatives of “the community planning agency … the bank’s workforce [it too is a workplace] and … the firms that do business with the bank.”​[29]​  Banks are not vehicles of investment, though they may protect individuals’ savings (without interest).  Instead, banks distribute funds to encourage new development in the firms normally associated with it.
The idea is to ensure wide distribution of tax-sourced monies to entrepreneurial, cooperatively structured businesses.  “Communities thus have an incentive to seek out new investment opportunities, so as to keep the allocated funds at home.”​[30]​  The goal is full employment through a dynamic innovation system,​[31]​ though in Economic Democracy, this is only guaranteed by the government, the employer of last resort.​[32]​  By this social mechanism, he aims to bring rampant individual wealth accumulation under control and increase the well-being of the social body.  To control the profit lust typical of capitalist businesses, Schweickart proposes decoupling labor and commodities, thereby building profit only on “the difference between total sales and total non-labor costs.”​[33]​  Schweickart also reconfigures capital ownership.  Building on contemporary trends in employee-stock ownership plans, workers are elevated to full ownership, so that capital remains in the hands of the laborers, as does control over the company.​[34]​
Schweickart’s is a hopeful, comprehensive vision, with control of business in the workers’ hands, and control of investment in social hands.  But it is probably obvious to the anarchist reader that such a vision exercises control from the top down, as the original soviet system was to have done.  Centralized systems assume the goodness of the individuals who fill governmental and planning roles.  Schweickart’s model of social order, borrowed wholesale from representative democracy, also will slow down the economic innovation process.  The problem with Schweickart’s model is his acceptance of representative democracy as the main social ordering mechanism.  In representative democracy, individuals and groupings substantially give up self-determination for easier but thinner moment-to-moment existence, allowing elected representatives to control macroscopic and mesoscopic issues and processes.  Representational democracy mediates what could, in the advanced digital age, be worked out directly and voluntarily,​[35]​ rather than being indirectly decided through representatives and then coercively foisted upon the represented.  His choice of the original state as the framework for transformed economic life results from a philosophical problem, namely reification: taking an aggregate and event as a substantial thing answering to a convenient label.  
This means that his model allows present political structures and processes to repeat themselves: election of representatives, legislation by bodies of representatives, policy-making and police powers exercised by departments of the executive branch.  But this reduplicates all the present system’s problems.  For him, workplace democracy, coupled with representative democracy outside the workplace is sufficient transformation of our political system.  We have in Schweickart a form of Economic Representative Democracy, which is not better at all, for Representative Democracy has a fatal delay built in.  A decision is made and no action occurs, or only occurs after the deciding is forgotten.  Between decision and action intervene a whole slew of mediations and interference structures.  The purpose of the original action becomes purely textual. In the formal organizations and institutions of representative democracy, enormous quantities of energy (physical, intellectual, and emotional) are squandered on keeping people in someone else’s lines.  Elective, generic representation is not democracy; it is an abdication of democracy: “Go make decisions for me in all areas of life for X amount of time.”  This is democracy deferred. State reification economics cannot be democratic, for the bodies that make decisions are not federative and issue oriented.  
By contrast, anarchism advocates decisions followed immediately by actions: gathering materials, organizing into task groups, laying out relations, carrying out the work.  This is why it embraces participation, voluntary association, first-order federation, and at best only loose second-order confederation.  It dismantles state forms by replacing them with habit-formed and habit-forming face-to-face processes, leaving no vacuum for third-party management of experiencing.  While generic representation is a failure, episodic, particular representations have been successful at all levels: “Go make a decision for me concerning issue Y.”  To allow a representative for a single decision is temporally closer to the requisite action than that of the former.  “We need a decision in order to take action on Y collectively, but we need no one to make decisions for us on L, M, or D, or there is a more appropriate body, perhaps even a face-to-face one that should make the decision.”  Episodic, federative representation avoids the reifying tendency of generic representation.  This is what Parecon proposes.

Participatory Economics (Parecon)
Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel have assembled a model of economic flow that they think will engender a more just, equitable, materially satisfied, variable, and self-determined​[36]​ society and experiencing.  Treating of labor, allocation, and consumption, they propose a model that is fully participatory, thus the moniker, Participatory Economics.  In participatory economics, the planning activity usually relegated to central bureaucracies or to corporate managers and boards, and sometimes whole industries, is completely distributed to every person and grouping with a direct interest in the situation and its outcome.  
In the workplace, they imagine an adaptive, federative structure in which teams of all varieties come into being and decisions are made by groups most relevant to them.  Sometimes this involves small work teams, other times it is a workplace-wide process, and other times a process that needs only representatives from each work team to meet.  This progressive, federative form for decision-making certainly has numerous precedents, and studies of the efficiency and success of worker-management models have demonstrated that they lose nothing desirable compared to more typical hierarchical models.  What workers must dedicate to meeting time they gain in not having to deal with problems generated by hierarchical relations.  They also are protected from the possibility that one person can make a killing by being either the owner or the all-powerful executive.  
To achieve fairness broadly in the kind of work performed, a controversial goal for some theorists, Albert and Hahnel propose balancing “task bundles” within the workplace and regionally balancing the quality of work life by ensuring the easy combination of more desirable and less desirable jobs.​[37]​  If, for example, X has been employed by a worker-cooperative in a field that has primarily pleasant, safe tasks to do, X expects to spend some portion of his work-week or work-month in less desirable work in the same city or region, in order to relieve the work displeasures of those whose primary assignment is in noxious settings.  Within the workplace, X’s cluster of tasks as an employee has roughly the same degree of utility and disutility as any other person’s.
A final innovation of the workplace is that the production of the workplace is to be planned each year through an iterative process, beginning with previous production numbers, the desires of individual workers to work a certain number of hours in a year, and other pertinent information gathered from society (mostly from the consumption side of planning, as I will describe below).  Through successive stages of feedback from consumers and down- and up-stream producers, eventually a workplace will home in on production numbers that will suit the upcoming year.  Flexibility can be built into the production planning by allowing individuals to volunteer to work more hours to make more money (really, more consumption power for the next consumption year, as below).  In this way, overages and shortages, the cancers of production, can be anticipated and made up, respectively.  This eliminates surplus, which is a form of necessary waste in market economies.  It also increases individual intelligence by engaging and developing reasoning powers, rather than relegating planning to an already-endowed intelligentsia.​[38]​  Given increased diversity in thinking about products, participatory production planning would also provoke changes in the kinds of products made, and workers would shift their labor power—which is self-determined—to needed products .  The federative council structure of workplaces is a critical condition for the success of this iterative planning, for worker’s councils of various levels and concerns teach the skill and induce the habit of participation.​[39]​  This is necessary for the complex process and emotional/intellectual rigors of planning production.  Workers will be well-versed in adjusting their actions to the actions of others, and reducing the dominance of self in their projects.
Work is not the only component of an economy.  There is no economy without consumption.  And yet most economic theories pay no mind to the problems of consumerism.  Advertisers and marketers remain free to play on the emotions, create desires, manipulate spending, and influence the private material life of individuals (by determining what they may buy in order to meet their needs and wishes).  Market economists seem to think that consumption is the highest kind of spiritual attainment for people living in a god-free age; even religious leaders and ecologists embrace consumerism.  Consumption is almost never critiqued, and even in alternatives like food cooperatives, marketing, advertising, and promotions are given free rein.  Hence, Albert and Hahnel’s proposal about annual planning for consumption is an important consideration for anarchist economics.​[40]​  Just as production can be planned within production groupings and within industries, consumption can be planned within homes, neighborhoods, and consumption groupings.  The iterative process, in which feedback is exchanged with producers, allows people to build up a consumption plan based on previous years’ actual consumption and ongoing production planning; to volunteer for extra work to be able to consume more; and to work less to enjoy a simpler consumption year with more free time.  It is a flexible process.
The effects of consumption planning force consideration of issues that cannot be raised and do not come up in capitalist consumption systems or in Economic Democracy: whether this product is really needed, whether this product has excessive waste streams, whether I am putting more of my personality into my purchases than is healthy, and whether I define freedom as unbridled consumption.  Though Schweickart wishes to deny the capitalist rich their wealth, he ignores the more widespread harm of consumerism.  Parecon, however, leaves people free to adjust their consumption to suit their inclinations in the context of real conditions of scarcity and ecological degradation.  So a likely outcome from consumption planning is the anarchic (ethical, educational) transformation of the basic attitudes which organize daily material actions and exchange relations of individuals and groupings, and a concomitant simplification of lifestyles.
Together, production planning and consumption planning constitute the allocative process.  Since planning occurs over a month or more of time, it is a live, immediate process.  It happens while production and consumption are already going on, and thus is directly informed by actual life and flows of experiencing.  The allocation of goods and labor power is not decided by others, either on the production side—in departments of product development, or on the consumption side—by one’s imagination, greed, and fiscal power.  Allocation is self-organizationally worked out.​[41]​  It is not the mysterious, illegible process of epochal economies.  Parecon decisions about production and consumption are real and direct decisions, made in the context of all the on-going, self-determining actions of ordinary life.  The very participatory nature of production and consumption is what makes allocation not rationally planned from above, but intelligently worked out by all and sundry.  These two spheres of planning, in which all are involved, induce correlative changes in human disposition and skills.  This is what capitalists are loath to do, and what central coordinators coercively do (the dispositional changes in central-coordinator economies don’t stick, precisely because they are imposed, not learned).  Fully participatory economies non-coercively change dispositions by negating the mediating influence of marketers over personal desires and tastes.  It has been said that there is no accounting for taste, and this may be true psychologically, but it is patently false socially.  The entire capitalist logic is predicated on accounting for and manipulating taste!  An anarchist economic scheme must counter-account for taste, free it from the coercive forces innate in capitalism.  This is where participatory allocation comes in—it is a system-wide effort to liberate inclination, and take the wind out of the sails of consumerism.  Hence, not only does Parecon promise more justice, balance and equity, it also elicits human development through a participatory, educative society.
Critiques of market and market-socialist theories shows that a new mental habit has emerged in human consciousness over the last century.  People have become more susceptible to the depredations of image-management, advertising, and marketing.  Its corollary is the study of consumer behavior, which partners with marketing to mediate human experiencing.  There is need, then, for critique and invention in regards to consumerism and materialism.  Consumers are made, not born.  The materialistic middle class is a product of capitalism.  Consequently, most members of any economy are people to whom anything can be marketed.  Planning consumption would be one way to curb the tendency toward consumerism and materialism.  Since both are historically produced dispositions, another disposition could be produced, namely, non-materialistic consumption, or flow complication.
The most anarchistic features of Parecon are the consumption planning and full-participation allocation, which consumption planning is part of.  Parecon’s consumption-side economics promises to bring about a social body composed of people to whom nothing can be marketed, not goods, nationalist sentiments and projects, nor representatives.  Albert and Hahnel provide a foretaste of a non-materialistic consumption-side economy.  And though it is a fiction in being a total system to be implemented, Parecon is organized around the single most important feature for anarchist social order, participation, which fulfills the anarchic disposition of unmediated exchange actions.

Model for Growth: Mitotic
Before articulating specifically what I think emerges from anarchic economic theorizing, I’d like to mention an aspect of one model, not strictly economic but organizational, from an unlikely source for anarchists.  In Washington, DC, there is a Christian congregation called the Church of the Savior.  It was founded in the 1950s by Gordon Crosby, and written about at length in the books of Elizabeth O’Connor.  As the church grew in the early years, they recognized immediately that they faced a danger.  If they were going to continue being a place that nurtured not only its members but also the poor in the community around them, large size was only going to get in the way.  This didn’t mean that they would not grow—there is health in growth.  But they understood that an infinite linear kind of growth, say like that of uncontrolled populations, was antithetical to the work and experiencing within the church.  So they adopted a form of growth by which, when they achieved a certain size, they would split into two or more groups, with distinct identities and distinct work in the community.  This led to and extended the notion of “mission groups” in which all the service work of the church was accomplished.  It was a very free structure, also very inventive.  It allowed a member to present an idea to the congregation for a work that they wanted to carry out, say a pottery studio.  Should two others in the congregation agree to be part of that work, the church funded the beginning operation of it until it could support itself.  Over time, the mission group structure and the congregational organization evolved so that the Church of the Saviour became a factory for small, intimate, face-to-face group actions throughout the city of Washington, DC.  Eventually the church split into seven sister churches, affiliated as a federation, but otherwise wholly independent.  Each of the seven churches had their own population of mission groups, sometimes a dozen or more; furthermore they had discrete budgets and identities.  This is a model of affiliation and autonomy that should inform any anarchist economics.  The principle of growth is mitotic, like organic cells.  Mitotic growth-and-divide is non-arbitrary.  It invites imagination, invention, productive relations, while also limit one kind of growth, namely maximization of the same form.  In linear growth, the first principle is expanded, applied endlessly, unless externalities demand an adjustment, as it has, say, at Amazon.  Originally a bookseller, Amazon came up against the maximum amount of books that Americans could consume, and they still were barely profitable.  In order to continue growing, they had to pull other merchandise into their field.  The single organization principle—on-line retailing as Amazon.com—was pushed farther and farther.  This model of maximization is not quite opposed by the mitotic model, since mitosis yields greater amounts, but in mitosis, the cell does not grow endlessly.  It reaches an optimum size for continued productivity and for linking up with other cells to become organs and organisms (in a very complex process whose description is outside the scope of this essay, but which can be called emergence), then it divides.  Similarly, the social cells of the Church of the Savior add to their mass (notably, not through evangelization), but divide that mass into inventive and productive half-masses.  This meme concerning organizational mitosis would then be distributed in the actions, relations, argots, and bodies of the members, carried out from multiple centers to new centers, the new congregation, thereby expanding this sustainable principle of growth.  There is increased “room” for group action, since the emotional and physical energies of the persons involved are not all horded for one activity.  Some actions need many individuals contributing, but in the interest of the self-determination of emotion and thus commitment, the individuals need to be free to imagine and invent new actions, to address entirely distinct problems, which are always arising.  Massive organizations and corporations artificially negate new problems, ignore them until they become destructive, and then have a hard time addressing them.  They falsify reality, in order to restrict reality to what they can handle within the given organizational reach.  Such a model for organization can hardly be called autonomous, self-organizing (since it denies context), nor would experiencing in such conditions be unmediated.  Corporations like Amazon heavily mediate or interfere with experiencing by individuals and groupings.  Mitotic assemblages like the Church of the Savior, though they endure through time, are much more fluid, flexible, educatable and educational.  They incubate and promote social entrepreneurship.  They are ever new.    They maintain the directness of action, keep commitment voluntary and material life local.


A General Theory of Anarchic Economies
Anarchic economic thinking suggests that an economy can be imagined and detailed that is not another form of mediated exchange action.  Albert and Hahnel, and Alperovitz, develop social life from the bottom-up, retaining greater self-management for the level of persons, neighborhoods and workplaces, and less for commonwealths and nations.  This preserves participation.  Anarchic economy takes form as some degree of local sociality in production workplaces and consumption neighborhoods.  It involves allocation among those and between multiple local socialities (within regions) and among many proximate regions.  Therefore, what precipitates out from the anarchic interaction of the above theories is participation.
All forms necessary to self-determination are implicated in the concept of participation: self-determination, room to act, voluntariness, and cooperation, or co-management of experiencing by self and others.  An anarchic economy is an action-informing sense of network relations rather than a codified, formally reticulated system.  It is an indeterminate, open-ended promise in all actions, best fulfilled by theories in which the processes of social life educate participants toward an autonomous, cooperative ethic, while the emerging ethical habits lend credence and strength to processes.  If a theory centralizes experiencing, even near-capitalist forms of life such as consumer cooperatives can be viable, transitional economic forms for anarchists.  Cooperation allows for unmediated experiencing, including unmediated exchange action.  Cooperatives have been referenced in most alternative economic visions of the last fifty years.  The feature that inspires such trust in the cooperative model is economic participation.  If we wish to make exchange relations more self-determining, we could do worse than to turn to consumer cooperatives.  Furthermore, cooperative funding offers one way of spreading participation in our capitalist economy, for it is essentially loose, free-flowing capital.  In effect this would distribute the organizational meme of cooperation more broadly throughout a community.  Eventually, this will bring into being the self-organizing network in which all economic action is participatory, again comprising the essence of anarchic economy.
Where mainstream economics is mediated exchange action, anarchic economy emerges from unmediated, or direct, exchange action.  Action can be direct in three ways: in individual doings (reading a book), in one-on-one exchange (of materials, information, equipment, skills, emotion), and in collective exchanges (within a worker-cooperative, for example, or between a supplier and a manufacturing firm).  The last two are the site of economic life per se.  In them, the flows are inter- and trans-personal.  In other words, the basis of anarchic economy is participation, which is a form of direct action explicitly in group settings, or grouped direct action.  Such settings are constituted by and sustain individual direct action.  Without openness to participation at all levels, economics falls short of anarchism.  Self-determination in the management of flows is suppressed when one is structurally excluded from relevant decisions.  Economic models may thus be judged according to the degree of participation that they build into the protocols.  All persons with relevant and direct interest in a problem, process, or outcome of a process must be free to weigh in on deliberation, decision, control protocols, and action.  Participation is the factor which determines the anarchy of economies.  
The capitalist structuring of life excludes participation from so much of human existence.  Some workplaces are worker-managed, some are even worker-owned, but the communities in which such workplaces are located have no say over the values, processes, and results of the workplace itself.  The treatment for structural disutility is not personal ethical transformation, however desirable this is.  The proper remedy is procedurally and habitually protected participation.  In this light, it is clear that the economic models which encourage participation in all sectors of economic life are the more supportive of the social order of anarchy. Albert and Hahnel give the most complete picture of a full-participation economy, in which not only labor structures and allocation processes but consumption structures are participatory processes.
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